Semi-Infinite Assignment Problems and Related Games by Llorca, N. et al.
Semi-Inﬁnite Assignment Problems
and Related Games
NatividadLlorca Stef Tijsy Judith Timmerz
Abstract
In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduced assignment games associated to ﬁnite as-
signment problems in which two types of agents were involved and they proved that
these games have a non-empty core. In this paper we look at the situationwhere the set
ofonetypeisinﬁniteandinvestigatewhenthecore oftheassociatedgameisnon-empty.
Two inﬁnite programming problems arise here, which we tackle with the aid of ﬁnite
approximations. We prove that there is no duality gap and we show that the core of
the corresponding game is non-empty. Finally, the existence of optimal assignments is
discussed.
Keywords: Inﬁnite programs, assignment, cooperative games, balancedness.
1 Introduction
Nowadays many markets and transactions are bilateral, so ’two-sided’ market models have
become widely used in economic theory.
Since 1972, when Shapley and Shubik ([9]) introduced ﬁnite assignment games, much
workrelatedtothesegameshasbeendeveloped. WepointoutthebookofRothandSotomayor
([7]) as an important monograph on two-sided matching. Curiel ([1]) provides a thorough
analysis of assignment games. In their work, Shapley and Shubik proved that the core of
an assignment game is the non-empty set of solutions of the dual problem corresponding to
the assignment problem. In ([8]), Sasaki gives axiomatic characterizations of the core of
assignment games. Some generalizations and extensions of these models are presented in
Kaneko and Wooders ([5],[6]).
In this paper, we look at semi-inﬁnite assignment problems where the number of one of
the two types of agents involved is ﬁnite and the other is countable inﬁnite and we prove that
semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment games are balanced. Recently, Fragnelli et al. ([2]) and
Timmer et al. ([11]) have studied some kinds of semi-inﬁnite balanced games arising from
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1different linear programming situations, where one of the factors involved in the problem is
countable inﬁnite but the number of players is ﬁnite. However, here we tackle semi-inﬁnite
assignment games with the aid of some tools that are related to Tijs ([10]).
This paper consists of four sections. In the next section we present the most relevant
deﬁnitions and results for the assignment problem with two ﬁnite sets of agents. We extend
these problems in section 3 to semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment problems where one of
the sets of agents is countable inﬁnite and the set of values of matched pairs of agents is
upper bounded. We show that the corresponding primal and dual program have no duality
gap and that there exist optimal solutions to the dual program, which is equivalent to the
non-emptiness of the core of the corresponding game. Finally, in section 4 we introduce the
critical number and the existence of optimal assignments is discussed.
2 Finite Assignment Problems
An assignment problem describes a situation in which there are two types of agents, for
example, sellers and buyers or ﬁrms and workers. Denote by M and W respectively these
two ﬁnite and disjoint sets of agents. Let m be the number of agents in M, i.e., m = jMj,
and n = jWj. Assume without loss of generality that m  n. When agenti 2 M is matched
to agent j 2 W then this gives the couple a value of aij  0. An assignment problem is thus
described by the triple (M;W;A) with A =[ a ij]i2M;j2W:
The maximal total value of paired agents, where each agent i 2 M is coupled to at most










xij  1; for all j 2 W
P
j2W
xij  1; for all i 2 M
xij 2f 0 ;1 g ;for all i 2 M; j 2 W:
(1)
The assignment matrix X 2f 0 ;1 g
M W;X=[ x ij]i2M;j2W;corresponds to the situation
in which the agents i 2 M and j 2 W are matched if and only if xij =1 :
We will distinguish between two types of assignments or matchings. An M-assignment
is an injective function  : M0 ! W; where M0  M; and a W-assignment is an injective
function  : W 0 ! M where W 0  W: A complete M-assignment is an M-assignment
 : M ! W; thus M0 = M; which is only possible if m  n: To an assignment matrix X
there corresponds the M-assignment x : Mx ! W and the W-assignment x : Wx ! M
where Mx =
n




;W x =f j2Wj
P
i 2 Mx ij =1 gand x(i)=jif
xij =1 ;for all i 2 Mx; and x(j)=iif xij =1 ;for all j 2 Wx: Conversely, corresponding
to an M-assignment  : M0 ! W is the assignment matrix X with xij =1if i 2 M0 and
j = (i); otherwise xij =0 :
Given an assignment problem (M;W;A); the corresponding assignment game (N;w) is
a game with player set N = M [ W.L e tSNbe a coalition of players. Then the worth
w(S) is deﬁned to be the maximal value this coalition can obtain by matching its members.
Deﬁne MS = S \ M and WS = S \ W: If MS = ; or WS = ; then w(S)=0since no
















X0 =[ x ij]i2M0;j2W0 is an























for all complete M-assignments 0: Let Op(A) be the set of these optimal matchings.
The vector (u;v), u 2
RM
+ and v 2
RW
+, is called a feasible payoff for the assignment






i2M ai(i). In this case, we say ((u;v);)is a feasible outcome and it is stable if (u;v) is



































If(u;v) 2 C(w)is proposed as payoff to the players, then each coalition S  N gets at least




j2WS vj  w(S). Thus no coalition
has an incentive to break up with the grand coalition N. The following lemma by Roth and
Sotomayor ([7]) tells something more about stable outcomes.
Lemma 2.1 (Roth and Sotomayor) Let ((u;v);)be a stable outcome for (M;W;A). Then
(a) ui + vj = aij if (i)=j
( b )u i=0and vj =0for all unassigned i and j:
Thisresultimpliesthat atastableoutcome,theonlyutilitytransfersoccur betweenagents
in M and W who are matched to each other. It also shows that those players who remain
unmatched in some optimal solution receive a zero payoff.
It is well knownthat if we replacethe integer condition xij 2f 0 ;1 ginthe linear program
(1)byxij  0foralli 2 M, j 2 W, thenall theoptimalsolutionswill stillhave xij 2f 0 ;1 g .








s:t:u i + v j  a ij; for all i 2 M; j 2 W
ui;v j 0; for all i 2 M; j 2 W:
Because the primal problem has a solution, we know that also (D) must have a solution
and the fundamental duality theorem asserts that these programs attain the same value. We
denote by Od(A) and Rd(A) the set of optimal dual solutions and the set of feasible dual
solutions, respectively.




j2WS vj  w(S) for any coalition S, which ensures that this coalition cannot
improve by splitting off from N when (u;v) is proposed as payoff. The following theorem
says that these conditionsare exactly the conditions that determinethe core of an assignment
game.
3Theorem 2.2 (Shapley and Shubik) Let (M;W;A) be an assignment problem. Then the
core of the corresponding assignment game is the non-empty set of solutions of the dual LP
for the grand coalition N, i.e., C(w)=O d( A ) .
Moreover, if  is an optimal assignment then ((u;v);)is a stable outcome for all core-
elements (u;v).V i c ev e r s a ,i f((u;v);)is a stable outcome then  is an optimal assignment
(see [7] for the proofs). So, we can concentrate on the payoffs to the agents rather than on
the underlying assignment.







Then the maximization problem of N = M [ W equals




xij  1; for all j 2 W
P
j2W
xij  1; for all i 2 M
xij 2f 0 ;1 g ;for all i 2 M; j 2 W:
One of the optimal solutions is: x12 = x21 =1and xij =0otherwise. Thus the third agent
of W is not matched. The corresponding optimal assignment  : M ! W is: (1) = 2 and
(2) = 1 and the value of this program equals vp(A)=w ( N)=3 .
The dual problem reads
min u1 + u2 + v1 + v2 + v3
s:t:u i + v j  a ij; for all i 2 M; j 2 W
ui;v j 0; for all i 2 M; j 2 W:
One of the dual solutions is: u1 = u2 =1 ,v 1=0 ,v 2=1and v3 =0 . It is easy to check
that (1;1;0;1;0) is a core-element of the corresponding 5-person assignment game. Note
that since agent 3 2 W is not matched, he should receive v3 =0 .
Let (M;W;A) be an assignment problem and let j 2 W.B yB i ( j;A) we denote the set
of agents in W nf jgwho are at least as good as j for agent i 2 M,s o ,
B i( j;A)=f k2Wjk 6 = j; aikaijg:
The following proposition tells us that an agent j 2 W gets zero in each core-element if for
each i 2 M there are at least m (weakly) better agents in W than j.
Proposition 2.4 Let(M;W;A)bean assignment problemandlet j 2 W.I fj B i( j;A)jm
for all i 2 M then vj =0for all (u;v) 2 Od(A).
Proof. Take an optimalassignment  2 Op(A).I fj= 2f  ( i ) j i2M g , then vj =0by lemma
2.1.
If j = (i) for some i 2 M then there is a k 2 Wnfjg such that k 2 Bi(j;A) n
f(i)ji 2 Mnfigg because jBi(j;A)jmand jf(i)ji 2 Mnfiggj = m − 1.B u t
k is not matched, implying vk =0by lemma 2.1. Since k 2 Bi(j;A) we have that
ui = ui + vkaikaij = ui + vj where the last equality follows from (i)=j . Thus
vj  0 and since vj  0 by the dual program we conclude that vj =0 .
2
43 Semi-Inﬁnite Bounded Assignment Problems
In this section we introduce semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment problems (M;W;A),w h e r e
M=f 1 ;2 ;:::;mg; a ﬁnite set, W =
N, the countable inﬁnite set of natural numbers, and
0  aij  b for some b 2
R, for all i 2 M, j 2 W. We analyze the corresponding semi-
inﬁnite bounded assignment games by ﬁnite approximation matrices An 2
Rmn where
An =[ a ij]i2M;j=1;2;:::;n, and by means of the so-called hard-choice number of the matrix A,
to be introduced later. Since m<1we will talk, from now on, about assignments instead
of (complete) M-assignments.
We start by deﬁning two types of agents in M. An agent i 2 M is of type 1 if this agent
can choose one-by-one m best elements j 2
N with respect to the largest reward aij.W e
denote by M1 the set of agents of type 1. If i 2 M n M1 then the agent is of type 2 and M2
denotes the set of all these agents.
The choice set Ci of an agent i of type 2 is the set of all his chosen best elements in
W. Since this agent cannot choose m best elements (otherwise he is of type 1), we have
0 j C i j<m . The choice set Ci of an agent i 2 M1 consists of those m agents in W
obtained in m steps by taking in each step that agent j 2 W not yet chosen by him and which
gives him the maximal value aij over all non-chosen j 2 W. In case there are more agents
j 2 W that give the same maximal value aij then we choose that agent j with the smallest
ranking number. The following example illustrates these concepts.




















Agent 1 2 M attains his maximal value of 3 if he is assigned to agent 1 2 W. The second
largest value he can obtain is a12 =2and a13 =1is the third largest value he can get. This
agent has no problemswith choosing histhreebest agents fromW and thereforehe is of type
1. His choice set thus equals C1 = f1;2;3g.
The largest value that agent 2 2 M can attain is a22 =1 . However, there is no second
largest value because a2n reaches the value 1 from below when n goes to inﬁnity. This agent
can only choose one best agent from W and therefore he is of type 2. His choice set equals
C2 = f2g.
Finally, agent 3 2 M has an easy job, since for all j 2 W he gets the value a3j =1 .A l l
agents in W are best elements for him. We will choose those three agents with the smallest
ranking number, thus C3 = f1;2;3g. This agent is of type 1. We conclude that M1 = f1;3g
and M2 = f2g.
We will now introduce the hard-choice number.
Deﬁnition 3.2 The hard-choice number n(A) is the smallest number in
N[f 0 gsuch that
m S
i=1
Ci f 1 ;2 ;::;n(A)g:
Lemma 3.3 Let (M;W;A) be a semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment problem. If j>n  ( A ) ,






  m for each
i 2 M:
5Proof. Note that j>n  ( A )implies that j= 2C ifor all i 2 M.I f i2M 1then Bi(j;A) \
f1;2;:::;n(A)gC ithus jBi(j;A) \f 1 ;2 ;:::;n(A)gj  jCij = m and we deﬁneni(j)=
j .I fi2M 2thenjCij <mand therearean inﬁnitenumber ofagents inW nf1;2;:::;n(A)g
strictly better than j. So, for n sufﬁciently large, say ni(j)  j, there are (at least) m agents







for all i 2 M.
2
Remark 3.4 From lemma 3.3 and from proposition 2.4 it follows that for all j>n ( A )and
for each (u;v) 2 Od(An), n  n(j), we have vj =0 .
Thegamescorrespondingtothesesemi-inﬁniteboundedassignmentproblemsaredeﬁned
as follows. The player set N = M [W consists of an inﬁnite number of players. The value














X(S)=[ x ij]i2MS;j2WS is an




otherwise. Just as in the previous section, the value w(N)=v p( A )of the grand coalition
N can be determined by the linear program (1), replacing the maximum by the supremum
since the set W is countable inﬁnite. The following problem is the dual when we replace the








s : t :u i + v j  a ij; for all i 2 M; j 2 W
ui;v j 0; for all i 2 M; j 2 W:
Notice that both the primal and the dual program have an inﬁnite number of variables and an
inﬁnitenumberof restrictions. Ingeneral,11-programsshowagapbetweentheoptimal
primal and dual value. There is a large literature on the existence or absence of so-called
duality gaps in (semi-)inﬁniteprograms. See e.g. the books by Glashoff and Gustafson ([3])
and Goberna and L´ opez ([4]). Our goal is to prove that here the primal and the dual problem
have the same value and that there exist optimal solutions of the dual problem. We achieve
this result in some steps starting with a limit process in the ﬁnite space
Rm
Rn, where for
the sake of brevity we will write n instead of n(A) in a subscript or a superscript.
Wetakeforeachn 2
Nwithn>n ( A ) ,anelement(un;vn)of Od(An). Thenweremove












n); 8n>n ( A ) . Note
thatf(un;s n (vn))jn 2f n ( A )+1;n (A)+2;:::ggisabounded set intheﬁnitedimensional
space
Rm
Rn since A is a bounded matrix and (un;vn)2O d(A n).S o ,
u
n
i maxfaijji 2 M;j 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;ngg  supfaijji 2 M;j 2
Ng
and similarly we get vn
j  supfaijji 2 M;j 2
Ng.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that lim
n!1(un;s n 
(vn)) exists (otherwise take a
subsequence) and we denote this limit by (u;v) 2
Rm 
Rn. With the aid of (u;v) we
constructthevector(b u; b v) 2
Rm
R1bytaking b u = uand b v = n(v),where k :
Rk!
R1
6is the map deﬁned by k(x)=( x 1;::;xk;0;0::) for all k 2
N and x 2
Rk.S o ,b vis obtained
from v by adding an inﬁnite number of zeros. Later we will see that (b u; b v) is a core-element
of the corresponding semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment game but we start with showing that
(b u; b v) is feasible in the dual problem.
Lemma 3.5 Let (M;W;A) be a semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment problem and let (b u; b v) be
as deﬁned above. Then (b u; b v) 2 Rd(A).
Proof. By deﬁnitionof (b u; b v) it holds that all its coordinates are non-negative. Furthermore,
b ui + b vj  aij for all i 2 M, j 2f 1 ; 2 ;:::;n(A)g since un
i + vn
j  aij for all i 2 M,





j  aij for all j 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;ngit followsby takingthe limit for n !1
that b ui + b vj  aij.S o( b u; b v) is a feasible solution of the dual problem.
2
Thenextthreelemmasdealwiththerelationsbetweenthevaluesoftheﬁnitesubproblems
and the inﬁnite problems and with weak duality.
Lemma 3.6 vd(A)  lim
n!1vd(An)






j = vd(An).W e
construct (b u; b v) as we did before and so it follows that
Pm
i=1 b ui +
Pn
j=1 b vj = lim
n!1vd(An):
Then, from lemma 3.5 we obtain that vd(A) 
Pm
i=1 b ui +
P1
j=1 b vj = lim
n!1vd(An).
2
Lemma 3.7 vp(A) = lim
n!1 vp(An)
Proof. Clearly vp(An)  vp(A) because each matching  : M !f 1 ;2 ;:::;ng in the ﬁnite
problem is also feasible in the inﬁnite problem. Furthermore, fvp(An) j n>n ( A ) gis an
increasing sequence. So, lim
n!1vp(An) exists and lim
n!1vp(An)  vp(A):
For the converse inequality, take ">0and a matching " : M !
N such that
Pm
i=1 ai"(i)  vp(A) − ".L e tk2
N be such that f"(i)ji 2 Mgf 1 ;2 ;:::;kg. Then for
all n  k : vp(An) 
Pm
i=1 ai"(i)  vp(A) − ": This implies that lim
n!1vp(An)  vp(A).
2
Lemma 3.8 Weak duality, vp(A)  vd(A), holds.
Proof. Note that Rd(A) 6= ; because (u0;v0)2R d(A),w h e r ev 0=0and u0
i =s u p j 2
Na ij
for all i 2 M. Take an assignment  : M !
















































7Now we formulate the main result in this section, which tells us that there is no duality
gap and that the set of optimal dual solutions is non-empty.
Theorem 3.9 Let(M;W;A)be a semi-inﬁnitebounded assignment problem. Then vp(A)=
v d( A )and Od(A) 6= ;:
Proof. First, we prove that there is no duality gap using the fact that ﬁnite problems have no
duality gap. From lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 follows,
vd(A)  lim
n!1vd(An) = lim
n!1vp(An)=v p( A ) :
Conversely, lemma 3.8 shows that vp(A)  vd(A): So vp(A)=v d( A ) = lim
n!1 vd(An):
Second, we prove that (b u; b v) 2 Od(A): It follows from the proof of lemma 3.6 and the
ﬁrst part of this proof that
Pm
i=1 b ui +
P1
j=1 b vj = lim
n!1vd(An)=v d ( A ) . Furthermore, by
lemma 3.5, (b u; b v) 2 Rd(A).S o ,( b u; b v) 2 Od(A).
2
Since Od(A) equals the core of the corresponding assignment game, it follows from this
theorem that semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment games have a non-empty core.
4 The Critical Number and Related Concepts
In this section, we present the critical number of a semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment game.
It turns out to be a key concept because, as we will show, it is related to the hard-choice
number, introduced in section 3, and to the ﬁnite approximations.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The critical number c(A) equals minfn 2
N j vp(An)=v p( A ) g;if there
exists an n 2
N with vp(An)=v p( A ) :Otherwise, c(A)=1 :
First, we present some results for ﬁnite critical numbers. The next proposition shows a
relation between the hard-choice number and the critical number.
Proposition 4.2 Let(M;W;A)beasemi-inﬁniteboundedassignmentproblem. Ifc(A) < 1
then c(A)  n(A).
Proof. Let  2 Op(A): If (i) = 2 Ci,f o ri2M 1, then Ci nf ( i )j i 2Mnf i gg6=;since
jCij = m and jf(i)ji 2 M nf i ggj =m−1. Thus thereis aj 2 Ci such that j 6= (i)for
all i 2 M1. If we redeﬁne (i)=jthen the matching remains optimal and agent i restricts
his choice to Ci.
For i 2 M2 there is no optimal matching  with (i) = 2 Ci. This follows immediately
from the deﬁnition of Ci. We conclude that  2 Op(A) but also  2 Op(An). Thus
c(A)  n(A).
2
As the next example shows, an optimal assignment can use agents j 2 W for which
j>n ( A ) .




















Wehaveseeninexample3.1thatC1 = f1;2;3g, C2 = f2g, C3 = f1;2;3g, M1 = f1;3gand
M2 = f2g.A l s o , n  ( A )=3 ,v p ( A )=5and each k, with k  3, deﬁned by k(1) =
1, k(2) = 2, k(3) = k, isoptimal. Fork>3wehaveoptimalmatchingswithk(3) = 2 C3;
but the assignment 3 is optimal and uses only elements in An. So, c(A)=n ( A )=3 .
The next example shows that we may have c(A) <n ( A ) .








Then C1 = f1;2g, C2 = f1;3g, n(A)=3and vp(A)=3 . An optimal assignment is
(1) = 2 and(2) = 1 and so c(A)=2<3=n ( A ) :
In the next theorem we characterize the structure of the sets of optimal primal and dual
solutions when the critical number is ﬁnite.




n  c ( A )
O p( A n)
(ii) Od(A)=
T
n  n ( A )
 n( O d( A n)):
Proof. (i) First, we prove that Op(A) [ n  c ( A )O p( A n) :If n  c(A) and  2 Op(An), then
Pm
i=1 ai(i) = vp(An)=v p( A ) :So,  2 Op(A):
Next, we prove that Op(A) [ n  c ( A )O p( A n) :Let  2 Op(A).T a k enc ( A )such that
f(1);:::;(m)gf 1 ;::;ng: Then,  2 Rp(An) and
Pm
i=1 ai(i) = vp(A)=v p( A n) .S o ,
2O p ( A n ) .
(ii)Suppose(u;v) 2 Od(A). Then, it followsfromremark3.4 thatvj =0forj>n ( A ) .
So, for n>n  ( A )we have (u;sn(v)) 2 Od(An) and (u;v) 2 n(Od(An)).C o n v e r s e l y ,
take an element in n(Od(An)) for all n  n(A). Then it is of the form (u;n(v)) where
(n(v))j =0for all j>n ( A ) .F o rn=n  ( A )there exists an optimal assignment . This
 is also optimal in A because vp(A)=v p( A n) . On the other hand,
Pm
i=1 ai(i) = vp(A)=
P m
i =1 ui +
P1
j=1(n(v))j.S o( u;n(v)) 2 Od(A).
2
In case c(A)=1 , we construct an auxiliary matrix H corresponding to the matrix A.
This m  (n(A)+j M 2j ) -matrix H is deﬁned by H =[ A n T]where for each i 2 M2 we
have a column tiei in T with ti =s u p f a ijj j 2
N n Cig and ei
k =1if k = i and ei
k =0
otherwise. We will show that there are no optimal assignments if c(A)=1 ,b u tv p ( A )
and "-optimal assignments can be obtained with the corresponding auxiliary matrix H.W e
illustrate these facts in the next example.

























Then C1 = f1;2;3g;C 2=f 1 g ;C 3=f 2 g ,M 1=f 1 g ,M 2=f 2 ; 3 gand n(A)=3 .
The feasible matching  with (1) = 3; (2) = 1;(3) = 2 has the property (i) 2 Ci
for each i 2 M. But this assignment is not optimal since
Pm
i=1 ai(i) =4<6=v ( A ) .I n
















where vp(H)=6and now the matching 0, with 0(1) = 1, 0(2) = n (n  3), 0(3) = 2,
is an
1
n−optimal assignment in A:
Theorem 4.7 Let(M;W;A)beasemi-inﬁniteboundedassignmentproblemwith c(A)=1
and let H be the corresponding auxiliary matrix. Then
(i) Op(A)=; ;
(ii) vp(A)=v p( H) ;
(iii) For each optimal  2 Op(H) and each ">0there is a matching " 2 Op(A) such
that "(i)= ( i )for all i 2 M1 and "(i) 2f n  ( A )+1 ;n (A)+2 ;:::g such that
ai"(i)  ti − "=m,i fi2M 2:
Proof. (i) For all assignments  : M !
N it holds for n large enough that f(i)j i 2 Mg
f 1 ;2 ;:::;ngand thus is  a matching for the assignment problem (M;f1;2;:::;ng;A n).
Together with c(A)=1this gives
m X
i=1
ai(i)  vp(An) <v p( A ) :
Hence, Op(A)=; .
To prove (ii) and (iii) it is sufﬁcient to show that
1. vp(H)  vp(A).L e t2R p ( A ) . Construct  2 Rp(H) as follows. Let i 2 M.I f
 ( i ) 2C ithen (i)= ( i ) .I f ( i )= 2C iand i 2 M1 then we can choose a partner
(i)=j 2C ibecause Ci is large enough. (See the proof of proposition 4.2.) If
(i) = 2 Ci and i 2 M2 then deﬁne (i)=j ,w h e r ej corresponds to column tiei in
T. Thus for all i 2 M we have hi(i)  ai(i),s o ,v p( H)v p( A ) :
2. vp(A)  vp(H) − " for all ">0 .L e t ">0and  2 Rp(H). We will construct
a matching " 2 Rp(A) as follows. Take one-by-one elements i 2 M. Note that
(i) = 2f 1 ; 2 ;:::;n (A)gnC i since otherwise player i can improve by choosing ti.
If (i) 2 Ci then deﬁne "(i)= ( i ) .I f  ( i )2Tthen take j >n  ( A )such that
10aij  ti − "=m and j 6= (i0) for all i0 6= i and deﬁne "(i)=j . This can be done





















where the last inequality holds because jfi 2 M j (i) 2 Tgj  m. Thus vp(A) 
vp(H) − ".
2
Given a semi-inﬁnite bounded assignment problem (M;W;A) consider the sequence
(u1; 1(v1)), (u2; 2(v2)), (u3; 3(v3));:::,w h e r e( u n;vn)2O d(A n)for all n 2
N: Denote
by L(A) the set of points that can be obtained as a limit of a subsequence as above. Then we
have the following result.
Theorem 4.8 L(A) 6= ; and L(A)  Od(A):
Proof. Analyzing the proofs in section 3 and the construction of (b u; b v); we conclude that
(b u; b v) 2 L(A) since b vj =0for all j>n ( A ) :Hence it may be clear that L(A)  Od(A):
2
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